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Nima uchun G'arbiy Evropada kichik davlatlar bor? Masalan, Andorra - Ispaniya va Frantsiya orasidagi kichik mamlakat. Yana bir misol - Frantsiya va Germaniya o'rtasida joylashgan Lyuksemburg. Hatto Frantsiya bilan o'ralgan Monako ham Italiya chegarasiga yaqin, kichik Lixtenshteyn Avstriya va Shveytsariya o'rtasida.
Bunday mamlakatlarning paydo bo'lishining umumiy sababi bormi? Masalan, ular atrofdagi davlatlarning madaniyati yoki siyosati bilan tanish bo'lmagan odamlarga o'z joylarini berish uchun yaratilganmi? Bu "oradagi" davlatlar G'arbiy Evropa hodisasi kabi ko'rinadi.
Dunyodagi har bir mamlakatning o'z tarixi bor. O'rta asrlarda Evropada yuzlab va ehtimol minglab kichik davlatlar bo'lgan, ularning aksariyati katta davlatlarga ozmi -ko'pmi bo'ysungan, ular o'z navbatida hali ham katta davlatlarga bo'ysungan va hokazo.
Keyingi o'rta asrlarda va zamonaviy davrda qudratli davlatlarning hukmdorlari tobora ko'proq o'zlariga bo'ysunuvchi davlatlar ustidan nazorat o'rnatishga va o'zlariga bo'ysunmagan kichik davlatlarni bosib olishga intilishdi.
Taxminan 500 yoki 600 yillik tarixdan so'ng, Evropa xaritasi asosan o'zlarini milliy tilda so'zlashadigan va o'zlarini milliy etnik guruhning a'zolari kabi his qiladigan yirik davlatlardan iborat. Etnik guruhlar va milliy chegaralar o'rtasidagi katta (lekin umuman emas) tasodif milliy hukumatlarning o'z chegaralari ichidagi barcha etnik guruh vakillarini milliy etnik guruh vakillariga aylantirish harakatlari bilan bog'liq.
Shunday qilib, Evropada qolgan bir nechta mayda -chuyda davlatlar, bir paytlar Evropada mavjud bo'lgan, katta davlatlar tomonidan qo'shilmagan tirik qolgan ko'plab sobiq mamlakatlarning qoldiqlari.
Lyuksemburgga kelsak, mamlakat mustaqilligi 19-asrning boshlarida, uning asosiy qal'asi poytaxt Lyuksemburg-Vilda mustahkam bo'lgani uchun o'rnatildi.
Ammo bunday emas, chunki ba'zi shafqatsiz millatchilar qal'ani mamlakatni imperialist bosqinchilaridan himoya qilish uchun ishlatgan bo'lardilar. Qal'a uni boshqarganlar uchun juda katta ustunlik bo'lgani uchun, Frantsiya, Gollandiya yoki Prussiya/Germaniyaga to'liq suverenitet berilishi qolgan ikkalasining xavfsizligiga tahdid solgan bo'lar edi.
Quvvatlarning muvozanati 19 -asrda va ehtimol Ikkinchi Jahon Urushigacha tinchlikning asosiy kafolati sifatida ko'rib chiqilgan. Bu kontseptsiya Buyuk Britaniyaning va Metternich singari ba'zi qit'a rahbarlarining Evropa siyosatini olib keldi. Natijada, Vena Kongressi (1815), birinchi London shartnomasi (1839) va Londonning ikkinchi shartnomasi (1867) asta -sekin kichik, mustaqil davlat Lyuksemburgga va uning poytaxti qal'asining demontajiga olib keldi. Hech qanday imperialistik kuch undan foydalanmasligiga ishonch hosil qiling.
Keyingi 150 yil davomida betaraf qolish Lyuksemburgga mustaqillikni saqlab qolish yoki tiklashga yordam bergan bo'lishi kerak, garchi u Germaniya tomonidan Ikkinchi jahon urushi paytida bosib olinishiga to'sqinlik qilmagan bo'lsa ham.
Bu aslida katta hodisaning bir qismidir - umuman olganda, Evropa siyosiy jihatdan dunyoning boshqa qismlariga qaraganda birlashgan emas. Misol uchun, Xitoy o'z tarixining ko'p qismida yagona imperiya edi, ko'pincha aholisi Evropadan ko'p edi. Taxminan 1500 yildan beri Hindistonda uning katta qismini boshqaradigan bitta imperiya bor edi.
Evropada urushda mag'lub bo'lgan tomonni ko'pincha g'olib tomon o'zlashtirmagan va ba'zida urushning natijasi ko'proq mamlakatlar, ya'ni 1 -jahon urushi.
So'nggi o'n yilliklarda, Yugoslaviya, SSSR va Chexoslovakiya bo'linib ketganidan keyin, juda ko'p davlatlar yanada kattalashdi.
Nima uchun bunday ekanligi haqida turli dalillar keltirildi. Ulardan biri Papaning ta'siri va uning har qanday davlatdan mustaqilligi edi. Bundan farqli o'laroq, dunyoning boshqa joylarida siyosiy hokimiyat ko'pincha diniy idoralar bo'lgan.
Yana bir sabab - bu Evropaning geografik tarqoqligi. Suv va tog'lar, tabiiyki, Buyuk Britaniya, Irlandiya, Skandinaviya, Iberiya va Italiya kabi bo'laklarga bo'linib, boshqa qismlarga bo'linadi.
Tahririyatimiz siz yuborgan narsalarni ko'rib chiqadi va maqolani qayta ko'rib chiqish kerakligini aniqlaydi.
EvropaEvropaning g'arbiy tomonga cho'zilgan yarim orollaridan tashkil topgan (Osiyo bilan ulkan quruqlik) va dunyodagi umumiy quruqlik maydonining o'n beshdan bir qismini egallagan dunyodagi ikkinchi eng kichik qit'alar. U shimolda Shimoliy Muz okeani bilan, g'arbda Atlantika okeani bilan, janubda (g'arbdan sharqqa) O'rta er dengizi, Qora dengiz, Kuma-Manich cho'kmasi va Kaspiy dengizi bilan chegaradosh. Qit'aning sharqiy chegarasi (shimoldan janubgacha) Ural tog'lari bo'ylab, so'ngra taxminan janubi -g'arbiy janubida Emba (Jhem) daryosi bo'ylab, Kaspiyning shimoliy sohilida tugaydi.
Evropaning eng katta orollari va arxipelaglari orasida Novaya Zemlya, Frans -Yozef Land, Svalbard, Islandiya, Farer orollari, Britaniya orollari, Balear orollari, Korsika, Sardiniya, Sitsiliya, Malta, Krit va Kipr bor. Uning asosiy yarim orollariga Jutland va Skandinaviya, Iberiya, Italiya va Bolqon yarim orollari kiradi. Ko'p sonli ko'rfazlar, fyordlar va dengizlar bilan ajratilgan, kontinental Evropaning juda tartibsiz qirg'oq chizig'i uzunligi 24000 milya (38000 km) ga yaqin.
Qit'alar orasida Evropa anomaliya hisoblanadi. Faqat Avstraliyadan kattaroq, bu Evrosiyoning kichik qo'shimchasi. Shunga qaramay, Shimoliy Atlantika okeaniga cho'zilgan qit'aning yarim orolli va g'arbiy g'arbiy chekkalari, uning kengligi va fizik geografiyasi tufayli, odamlarning nisbatan dahshatli yashash muhitini yaratadi va insoniyat tarixining uzoq jarayonlari bu mintaqani "qirg'oq" sifatida belgilab qo'ydi. o'ziga xos tsivilizatsiya uyi. Ichki xilma -xilligiga qaramay, Evropa inson ongida paydo bo'lgan paytdan boshlab, alohida dunyo bo'lib, Kristofer Marloudan "kichkina xonada cheksiz boylik" iborasini olishga harakat qildi.
Kontseptual qurilish sifatida, Evropa, qadimgi yunonlar haqida ko'proq bilib olganidek, Osiyo va Liviyadan farqli o'laroq, bu nom Afrikaning ma'lum shimoliy qismiga tegishli edi. Umuman olganda, Evropa endi "quyosh botishi" degan talqinni emas, balki "materik" ni nazarda tutgan deb o'ylashadi. Ko'rinib turibdiki, bu yunonlarga o'z dengiz dunyosida o'ziga xos xususiyatlarga ega bo'lgan Osiyo va Liviya kontseptsiyalaridan farq qiladigan, shimoliy kenglikdagi erlar uchun mos belgi sifatida o'zini taklif qilgan ko'rinadi. , nisbatan gullab -yashnagan va madaniyatli, yunonlar va ularning o'tmishdoshlari madaniyati bilan chambarchas bog'liq edi. Yunon nuqtai nazaridan, Evropa madaniy jihatdan qoloq va kam joylashdi. Bu vahshiylik dunyosi edi, ya'ni yunon bo'lmagan, uning aholisi tushunarsiz tillarda "bar-bar" shovqinlari bilan. Savdogarlar va sayohatchilar, shuningdek, Gretsiyadan tashqaridagi Evropaning o'ziga xos jismoniy birliklarga ega ekanligini, tog 'tizimlari va pasttekis daryo havzalari O'rta er dengizi mintaqasi aholisiga qaraganda ancha katta ekanligini aytishdi. Evropaning janubdan kirib kelishi bilan O'rta er dengizi chegaradoshlaridan tubdan farq qiladigan iqlimlar ketma -ketligi ham aniq edi. Keng sharq dashtlari va g'arbiy va shimoldagi boshlang'ich o'rmonlar, lekin odamlarning yashashi bilan ular atrof -muhitga qarama -qarshiliklarni ko'rsatib o'tdilar.
Qadimgi Rim imperiyasi, asosan, II asrda, o'z madaniyatini qit'aning ko'p qismiga ochib bergan va muhrlagan. Chegaralaridan tashqaridagi savdo aloqalari ham chekka hududlarni o'z sohasiga tortdi. Faqatgina XIX -XX asrlarga qadar zamonaviy ilm -fan Evropa qit'asining geologik va geografik chizig'ini aniqlik bilan chizishga muvaffaq bo'ldi, bu davrda xalqlar ustidan hukmronlik qilishdi va ular orasida katta qarama -qarshi harakatlarni boshlashdi. dunyoning qolgan qismining aholisi (qarang G'arb mustamlakachiligi).
Evropaning hududiy chegaralariga kelsak, ular dengiz qirg'og'ida nisbatan aniq ko'rinadi, lekin shimoldan va g'arbdan uzoq bo'lgan ko'plab orol guruhlari - Svalbard, Faro, Islandiya, Madeyra va Kanar orollari - Evropa, Grenlandiya ( siyosiy jihatdan Daniya bilan bog'langan bo'lsa ham) an'anaviy ravishda Shimoliy Amerikaga ajratilgan. Bundan tashqari, Shimoliy Afrika va Janubi -G'arbiy Osiyoning O'rta er dengizi qirg'oqlari Evropaning ba'zi jismoniy va madaniy yaqinliklarini namoyish etadi. Ayniqsa, Turkiya va Kipr, geologik jihatdan osiyolik bo'lsa -da, Evropa madaniyatining elementlariga ega va ularni Evropaning bir qismi deb hisoblash mumkin. Darhaqiqat, Turkiya Evropa Ittifoqiga (EI) a'zo bo'lishga intildi va Kipr Respublikasi 2004 yilda tashkilotga qo'shildi.
Evropaning chegaralari ayniqsa noaniq edi va shuning uchun sharqda, qit'a jismoniy chegaralarni ajratmasdan, G'arbiy Osiyoning bir qismi bilan birlashadi. Hozirgi kunda ko'pchilik geograflar tomonidan qabul qilingan sharqiy chegaralar Kavkaz mintaqasini istisno qiladi va Qozog'istonning kichik bir qismini qamrab oladi, bu erda Kaspiyning shimoliy qirg'og'idan tashkil topgan Evropa chegarasi Ural chegarasi bilan Qozog'istonning Emba daryosi va Mug'aljor tepaliklari bilan bog'langan. Uralning janubiy kengaytmasi. Geograflar taklif qilgan muqobil chegaralar orasida Buyuk Kavkaz tizmasi cho'qqisini Evropa va Osiyoni ajratuvchi chiziq deb biladigan sxema mavjud bo'lib, u Kavkazni Kavkaz mintaqasining shimoliy qismi, Evropa va Zaqafqaziyada joylashtiradi. janubiy qismi, Osiyoda. Boshqa keng tarqalgan tasdiqlangan sxema Evropada Kavkaz mintaqasining g'arbiy qismini va sharqiy qismini, ya'ni Ozarbayjonning asosiy qismini va Armaniston, Gruziya va Rossiyaning Kaspiy dengizi sohilining kichik qismini Osiyoda joylashtiradi. Boshqa tarafdorlari bo'lgan yana bir sxema Aras daryosi va Turkiya chegarasi bo'ylab kontinental chegarani aniqlaydi va shu orqali Armaniston, Ozarbayjon va Gruziyani Evropaga qo'yadi.
Evropaning sharqiy chegarasi, masalan, Janubiy Osiyo tsivilizatsiyasining shimoliy chegarasini aniq ko'rsatadigan Himoloyning izolyatsion ahamiyati bilan solishtiradigan erdagi madaniy, siyosiy yoki iqtisodiy uzilish emas. Odamlar yashagan tekisliklar, eskirgan Uralsning bir oz uzilishi bilan, Evropaning markazidan Sibirning markaziy qismidagi Yenisey daryosigacha cho'zilgan. Boltiq va Qora dengizlardan Tinch okeanigacha bo'lgan sobiq Sovet Ittifoqi egallagan hududning ko'p qismida slavyanlarga asoslangan tsivilizatsiya hukmronlik qiladi. Bu tsivilizatsiya Evropaning qolgan qismidan o'rta asrlardagi mo'g'ul-tatar hukmronligi meroslari bilan ajralib turadi, bu Evropaning "G'arb tsivilizatsiyasi" ning ko'plab yangiliklari va rivojlanishlarini bo'lishishga to'sqinlik qildi, bu sovet davrining nisbiy izolyatsiyasi davrida yanada o'ziga xos bo'lib qoldi. Dunyoni mazmunli katta geografik birliklarga ajratishda, shuning uchun ko'pchilik zamonaviy geograflar sobiq Sovet Ittifoqini qit'a bilan taqqoslanadigan, Evropadan g'arbda, Osiyodan janub va sharqda bir -biridan ajralib turadigan alohida hududiy birlik sifatida ko'rib chiqdilar. Sovet Ittifoqining to'rtdan uch qismini tashkil etgan Rossiya uchun saqlanib qoldi.
Evropa o'ziga tayinlangan an'anaviy chegaralarda taxminan 4 million kvadrat milya (10 million kvadrat kilometr) ni egallaydi. Bu keng hudud geologik tuzilish, relef, relyef yoki iqlimning oddiy birligini ko'rsatmaydi. Barcha geologik davrlarning jinslari ochilib, ulkan davrlar davomida geologik kuchlarning ishlashi tog ', plato va pasttekislik landshaftlarining shakllanishiga yordam berdi va turli xil mineral zaxiralarni meros qilib qoldirdi. Muzlik ham keng maydonlarda o'z izini qoldirdi va eroziya va cho'kish jarayonlari juda xilma -xil va bo'linadigan qishloqlarni yaratdi. Iqlimiy jihatdan, Evropaning sirtining juda oz qismi sovuq yoki haddan tashqari issiq va quruq bo'lsa, samarali joylashish va foydalanish uchun foydalidir. Shunga qaramay, mintaqaviy iqlim qarama -qarshiliklari mavjud: okeanik, O'rta er dengizi va kontinental tiplar, bir -biridan ikkinchisiga o'tish. Bilan bog'liq o'simliklar va tuproq shakllari ham doimiy xilma -xillikni namoyon etadi, lekin odamlar paydo bo'lganida materikning ko'p qismini o'rab turgan o'rmonzorlarning faqat bir qismi qolgan.
Umuman olganda, Evropa tuproq, o'rmon, dengiz va foydali qazilmalarning (xususan, ko'mir) katta va uzoq vaqtdan beri ishlatib kelinayotgan resurslar bazasiga ega, lekin uning aholisi tobora uning asosiy resursiga aylanmoqda. Qit'ada, Rossiyani hisobga olmaganda, butun dunyo aholisining o'ndan biridan kamrog'i bor, lekin umuman olganda, uning aholisi yaxshi ma'lumotli va yuqori malakali. Evropa, shuningdek, shahar-sanoat hududlarida to'plangan aholining yuqori zichligini qo'llab-quvvatlaydi. Shahar aholisining o'sib borayotgan foizi ko'pgina mamlakatlar iqtisodiyotida ustunlik qiladigan xizmat ko'rsatish sohasida band. Shunga qaramay, ishlab chiqarish va qishloq xo'jaligida Evropa haligacha etakchi o'rinni egallab turibdi. 1957 yilda Evropa iqtisodiy hamjamiyatining va 1993 yilda Evropa Ittifoqining tuzilishi ko'plab qit'a mamlakatlari o'rtasidagi iqtisodiy hamkorlikni sezilarli darajada kuchaytirdi. Evropaning davom etayotgan iqtisodiy yutuqlari uning yuqori turmush darajasi va ilm -fan, texnika va san'atdagi yutuqlaridan dalolat beradi.
Nima uchun davlatlar Birinchi, Ikkinchi yoki Uchinchi Dunyo deb tasniflanadi?
Odamlar tez -tez “Third World ” atamasini kambag'al yoki rivojlanayotgan davlatlar uchun stenografiya sifatida ishlatadilar. Aksincha, Qo'shma Shtatlar va G'arbiy Evropa xalqlari kabi boy davlatlar "Birinchi dunyo" ning bir qismi sifatida tasvirlangan. ” Bu farqlar qaerdan paydo bo'lgan va nega biz "Ikkinchi dunyo" haqida kamdan -kam eshitamiz. ? ”
Geosiyosatning "uch dunyo olami" va "x201D" modeli 20-asrning o'rtalarida Sovuq Urushning turli o'yinchilarini xaritaga solish usuli sifatida paydo bo'lgan. Kontseptsiyaning kelib chiqishi juda murakkab, ammo tarixchilar buni odatda frantsuz demografi Alfred Sauviga atashadi, u 1952 yilda "Uch dunyo, bitta sayyora" nomli maqolada “Third World ” atamasini yaratgan. , Birinchi Dunyo Qo'shma Shtatlar va uning kapitalistik ittifoqchilarini G'arbiy Evropa, Yaponiya va Avstraliya kabi joylarga kiritdi. Ikkinchi jahon kommunistik Sovet Ittifoqi va uning Sharqiy Evropa yo'ldoshlaridan iborat edi. Uchinchi dunyo, Sovuq Urushda har ikki tomon bilan ham faol bo'lmagan boshqa barcha davlatlarni qamrab oldi. Bular ko'pincha qashshoqlashgan sobiq Evropa koloniyalariga kiradi va Afrika, Yaqin Sharq, Lotin Amerikasi va Osiyoning deyarli barcha davlatlarini o'z ichiga oladi.
Hozirgi kunda G'arbning qudratli iqtisodiyoti ba'zan "Birinchi dunyo", "X201D" deb ta'riflanadi, lekin "Ikkinchi jahon" atamasi Sovet Ittifoqi parchalanishi ortidan eskirgan. “Third World ” asl belgilar orasida eng keng tarqalgan bo'lib qolmoqda, lekin uning ma'nosi “nonigned ” dan o'zgardi va rivojlanayotgan mamlakatlar uchun oddiy atamaga aylandi. Sovuq urushning qolgan qismi bo'lganligi sababli, ko'plab zamonaviy olimlar "Uchinchi dunyo" yorlig'ini eskirgan deb hisoblashadi. Hozir uning o'rnida ȁRivojlanayotgan mamlakatlar ” va “low va past-o'rta daromadli mamlakatlar ” kabi atamalar ishlatiladi.
G'arbiy Evropa xaritasi
G'arbiy Evropa, biz bilganimizdek, Sovuq urush davrida vujudga kelgan geosiyosiy qurilishdir. Garchi G'arbiy va Sharqiy Evropaga havola Rim imperiyasiga tegishli bo'lsa ham.
Ikkinchi Jahon Urushidan ko'p o'tmay SSSR va Angliya/AQSh o'rtasidagi ittifoq buzildi va sovuq urush boshlandi. Sharq va G'arb deb nomlangan ikki tomon. G'arb Evropaning G'arbiy ittifoqchi mamlakatlaridan, shu jumladan Ispaniya, Angliya va Frantsiya kabi mamlakatlardan iborat edi. Biroq, bu vaziyatda hatto Evropada bo'lmagan Amerika Qo'shma Shtatlari kabi davlatlar ham "G'arb" ning bir qismi hisoblanardi.
Sharqiy Evropa - SSSR tarkibiga kirgan va SSSRga bo'ysungan davlatlar konglomeratsiyasi. bu mamlakatlarning hammasi ham kommunistik mamlakatlar bo'lmasa ham. Bu erda biz Pasxa Evropasining yangi xaritasini oldik.
Sovuq urushdan keyin G'arbiy va Sharqiy Evropaning terminologiyasi saqlanib qoldi, garchi texnik jihatdan Sharq va G'arb o'rtasidagi chegaralar xiralashgan bo'lsa ham.
Yuqoridagi xaritada ko'k rangdagi mamlakatlar G'arb davlatlari hisoblanadi, garchi sovuq urush paytida Germaniya Sharq va G'arbga bo'linib ketgan bo'lsa. Yashil mamlakatlar tobora g'arblashib borayotgan va o'zlarini hozir G'arbiy Evropaning bir qismi deb hisoblaydigan mamlakatlardir. ularning ko'pchiligi Evropa Ittifoqiga qo'shilgan yoki qo'shilishga harakat qilmoqda.
Nega Evropa Ittifoqining G'arbiy va Sharqiylari birdek ishlay olmaydi?
2004 yilda sakkiz sobiq kommunistik mamlakat qo'shilganidan 15 yil o'tib ham, Evropa Ittifoqi haligacha bir butun emas, balki ikkiga bo'linadi. Ko'pgina G'arbiy Evropaliklar bu davlatlarni, shuningdek 2007 va 2013 yillarda qo'shilgan davlatlarni "ldquonew" va "rdquo" deb atashadi, bu esa to'liq "Evropa" bo'lishga qodir emasligini bildiradi. Vengriya Bosh vaziri Viktor Orb va aakuten va rsquosdagi o'zgarishlar.
O'z navbatida, Boltiqbo'yi, G'arbiy Bolqon va Markaziy Evropa mamlakatlari Evropani qo'llab-quvvatlagan holda qolsa-da, ularning ko'plari Evropa Ittifoqida o'zlarini yomon his qilishadi. Bu davlatlar jamoatchiligi o'z mamlakatlari Evropa Ittifoqining siyosatini ishlab chiqishga juda kam ta'sir ko'rsatadi deb o'ylashadi. Ayni paytda, ularning hukumatlari, qoidalarga ko'ra, tobora kamroq moyil bo'lib bormoqda, masalan, ba'zilar, masalan, Budapesht, Bryusselga qarshi isyon ko'tarish.
Cheklanmaydigan bo'linish va avtoritar sudralish haqidagi tushuncha 2004 yildan beri Evropa Ittifoqi kengayishining qayta baholanishiga olib kela boshladi. G'arbiy Evropada ko'pchilik hozir Evropa Ittifoqi juda uzoq va juda tez cho'zilgan deb o'ylaydi. Carnegie va rsquos Stefan Lehn ta'kidlaganidek, ba'zilari Frantsiya va Germaniya hukmronlik qilayotgan & ldquoCarolingian Europe & rdquo uchun nostaljikdir va Evropani tezlashtirishning ikki tezligi uchun engib bo'lmaydigan bo'linishni sezdi. yaqinda o'tkazilgan so'rovda respondentlarning foizlari 2004 yilgi kengayish xato ekanligini aytishgan.
Ammo Sharq-G'arb bo'linishi ikkala tomon uchun ham muammo tug'diradi. 2004 yildan keyin qo'shilgan shtatlardagi populistlar G'arbiy Evropaliklar hech qachon qo'shilish davlatlarini to'liq qabul qilmaganliklarini va Markaziy Evropaning haqiqiy o'rni Evropa Ittifoqi va Rossiya o'rtasida ekanligini ta'kidlaydilar. Aslida, Markaziy Evropadagi demokratlar o'zaro bog'liq ikkita muammoga duch kelmoqdalar: populistlar va rsquo ko'tariladi va G'arbiy Evropa unga javob beradi, bu populistlarni yanada kuchaytirish va demokratiyani o'ldirish xavfini tug'diradi.
G'arbiy evropaliklar uchun ajralish ularni o'z chegaralaridan kelib chiqadigan beqarorlikka qarshi immunitetga ega bo'lardi, deb o'ylash xayol. & Ldquoold & rdquo a'zolari o'z me'yorlari va qoidalarini & ldquonew & rdquo ga eksport qilishini yoki ikkinchisini & rsquos muammolarini import qilishini tan olish, bu birinchi navbatda kengayishga ilhomlantirgan narsa. Bu o'n besh yil oldin bo'lgani kabi hozir ham shunday. Ajralish, kengayish ikki tomonga olib kelgan farovonlikka ham xavf soladi. U qit'aning markazidagi savdo tartibini butunlay qayta aniqladi. Agar Visegr & aacuted 4 (Chexiya, Vengriya, Polsha va Slovakiya) bitta davlat bo'lganida, ular Germaniya va rsquosning eng yirik savdo hamkori bo'lar edi, ikki tomonlama savdoning yillik aylanmasi Xitoydan deyarli ikki baravar katta edi.
Shuning uchun, har ikki tomonning ko'pchiligi munosabatlarni himoya qilish va yaxshilash yo'llarini izlashga asoslari bor. Ammo ular norozilikning ildizlarini tushunishdan boshlashlari kerak va migratsiyaga har xil munosabat, lekin chuqurroq psixologik sabablar kabi, bevosita sabablarni bilish kerak. Evropaliklar bir -birlari haqida aytilmagan taxminlar qanday? Ular haqiqatan ham bir -birlarini qanchalik bilishadi? Qachon ular bir -biridan o'tib gapirishadi va nima uchun? Migratsion inqirozning eng yomoni tugaganga o'xshaydi (hozircha), lekin uglerod chiqindilarini qanday kamaytirish mumkinligi va Evropaning mudofaasi uchun AQShga bog'liq bo'lishi kerakmi degan bir qator potentsial bo'linmaydigan masalalar turibdi. Bu masalalar, agar Evropa Ittifoqiga a'zo davlatlar bir xil xatolarni takrorlamaslik uchun yo'l topmasa, keskinlikni qayta tiklash bilan tahdid qilmoqda. Ko'rinib turibdiki, ular o'tgan bir necha yillardan unchalik o'rganmagan.
Bunday norozilikning ildizlarini o'rganish aybni ayblash yoki jiddiy muammolarni, masalan, qonun ustuvorligi buzilishlarini, tushuntirish mumkin bo'lmagan kelishmovchiliklarni kamaytirish uchun mo'ljallanmagan. Qoidalar buzilganda, jarimalarga amal qilish kerak. Ammo hatto bu holatlarda ham, ehtimol, ayniqsa, bu holatlarda to'g'ri yondashuv va to'g'ri til muhim. Agar Evropa Komissiyasi yoki Evropa Parlamenti ma'lum bir hukumatga nisbatan tarafkashlik yoki hurmatsizlikni ko'rsatadigan tarzda harakat qilsa, bu xafagarchilikka uchragan hukumatning o'z ishi ortida jamoatchilik fikri va mintaqaviy qo'llab -quvvatlashini to'plashni osonlashtiradi. Masalan, Evropa Parlamenti qonun ustuvorligi buzilganligi sababli Budapeshtga qarshi ish yuritishni boshlashga ovoz berganida, Orb & aacutenga qarshi bo'lgan Markaziy Evropadagi parlament a'zolari ko'pchilikka qarshi ovoz berishgan. Bu mintaqadagi keng tarqalgan tuyg'uni aks ettirdi, G'arb Sharq va mdasha qarashlarini tushunmaydi, bu Evropa Ittifoqining ishonchini pasaytiradi va hamma joyda avtoritarlarni kuchaytiradi.
Evropa bu erga qanday keldi?
Nima uchun Sharq-G'arb munosabatlari shunchalik qashshoqlashib ketganiga oson javob shundaki, aslida tomonlar tubdan boshqacha qadriyatlarga ega va dunyoga boshqacha qarashadi. Bu qisman to'g'ri bo'lsa -da, nima uchun bu farqlar Evropa va Shimoliy va Janubiy, Evropa Ittifoqining katta va kichik davlatlari o'rtasidagi farqlardan ko'ra muhimroq ekanligini tushuntira olmaydi. Bu, masalan, Boltiqbo'yi kabi yaqinda qo'shilgan ba'zi mamlakatlar, nima uchun Evropa Ittifoqida Markaziy Evropaga qaraganda ko'proq o'zlarini uyida his qilishganini tushunishga yordam bermaydi.
Ziddiyatlarning chuqur ildizlarini tushunish uchun, Karnegi Evropa mutaxassislar guruhini yig'di (ettita Markaziy Evropadan va oltitasi G'arbiy Evropadan). Ularning tadqiqotlari, asosan, bir yil davomida Evropaning asosiy poytaxtlarida o'tkazilgan intervyularga asoslanib, shuni ko'rsatadiki, keskinlikning asl manbai, farqlarning o'zi emas, balki Sharq-G'arb tafovutlarining mohiyatini bilmaslikdir. Sharq-G'arb bo'linishi boshqa bo'shliqlarga qaraganda ko'proq bo'linishni isbotladi, chunki farqlarning tabiati yaxshi tushunilmagan.
Notanishlik konsensusga to'sqinlik qiladi
2004 yildagi kengayish nafaqat kattaligi, balki qirq o'n yil mobaynida parallel va alohida fazoda mavjud bo'lgan mamlakatlarni birlashtirgani bilan ham o'ziga xos edi. Bu kattalashtirishning avvalgi turlaridan farq qilardi. Bular har doim bir xil (G'arbiy) siyosiy blokdagi mamlakatlarni ko'rsatgan. Ularning fuqarolari Evropa Ittifoqiga qo'shilishdan ancha oldin sayohat qilishgan va bir-birining an'analari va tarixini bilishgan, bu G'arb va sobiq sovet blokiga xos bo'lmagan.
Migratsiya inqirozigacha G'arbda kam odam 2004 yilgi qo'shilishdan keyingi davlatlarning tarixi va o'ziga xosligi va irqqa (yoki bu masalada jinsiga) munosabati to'g'risida xabardor edi. Ko'pgina G'arbiy Evropa mamlakatlaridan farqli o'laroq, sobiq kommunistik mamlakatlarning aksariyati Sovuq Urushdan qat'iy millatchilik bilan chiqishdi, chunki bitta mamlakat bilan faxrlanish-bu kommunistik internatsionalistik e'tiqodga tabiiy javob edi. Moskva hukmronligining yana bir merosi - bu katta davlatlarning o'z hayotlarini qanday boshqarishni ko'rsatadigan beixtiyor xiralashgan qarashlari bo'lib, ular Evropa Komissiyasi va Evropa Parlamenti va Vengriya va Polshada qonun ustuvorligi masalalariga javob berishlari kerak edi.
2004 yilda qo'shilishdan oldingi yillarda va undan keyingi yillar davomida bir -birlarini tanimaslik unchalik ahamiyatli emas edi. G'arbiy Evropa mamlakatlari sobiq kommunistik mamlakatlarni boshqacha, lekin ular mehnatsevarlik, jasorat va fidoyilikning kombinatsiyasi orqali yo'q qilingan xorijiy totalitar tuzum qurbonlari deb hisoblashardi. Sobiq kommunistik mamlakatlarning tabiati va boshqalarni tushunmaslik mumkin edi, lekin bu deyarli yoqimli bo'lib tuyuldi va qo'shilish ularning o'tmishdagi azob-uqubatlariga ma'naviy jihatdan to'g'ri javob bo'ldi. Ba'zilar Boltiqbo'yi yoki Markaziy Evropa mamlakatlarini bo'yi teng bo'lmagan deb hisoblashlari muhim emas edi. Ko'pchilik Evropa Ittifoqiga a'zo davlatlar ularni jasur va zararsiz deb bilishgan va o'z vaqtida Sharq G'arbga o'xshab ketadi deb o'ylashgan.
Bu taxmin amalga oshmadi, lekin, ehtimol, hech qachon va hech qachon, xuddi shunday, Evropa Ittifoqi va kichik davlatlar har doimgidek katta davlatlarga ishonmaydilar, shimolliklar esa janubliklarning o'z mablag'larini boshqarishda gumon qilishda davom etadilar. Biroq, bu farqlar o'nlab yillar davomida kelishmovchiliklar efirga uzatilgan va sinovdan o'tgan. Sharq va G'arb o'rtasidagi farqlar, xususan, migratsiya masalasida, 2015 yildagi ekzistensial inqiroz paytida, tezda 1 millionga yaqin muhojirlar va Evropa Ittifoqiga qarshi o'ta o'ng partiyalar hamma joyda o'ta ojiz bo'lib tuyulardi.
Natijada, G'arb dastlab jozibali ko'rinadigan boshqacha ko'rinishni Evropa Ittifoqi va uning mavjudligi uchun xavf deb bildi. Va bu tuyg'u Bryusseldagi konsensus binosini zaharlashda davom etmoqda. Bir guruh a'zolari (siyosiy yoki boshqa) bir xil fikrda bo'lsalar, ular sabr -toqatli bo'lishga, umumiy til topishga va murosaga kelishga moyil. Ammo bu odatda guruhlar o'rtasida ro'y bermaydi, bunda birov boshqasini boshqacha, kam natijali yoki majburiyat deb biladi. Masalan, qonun ustuvorligi yoki migratsiya bo'yicha munozaralar paytida hukmni to'xtatib qo'yish, mahalliy xususiyatlarni ko'rib chiqish va boshqa tomonning ko'zlari bilan ko'rish, Evropa Ittifoqi siyosatining asosiy tarkibiy qismlari bo'lishi kerak edi. Shunga qaramay, bu Evropa Ittifoqi qoidalarini buzuvchilarni himoya qilish uchun emas. Gap shundaki, agar tanbeh berayotgan tomonga hech qanday xayrixohliksiz va tushuncha pozitsiyasida harakat qilsa, yakunda tanbeh samaraliroq bo'ladi.
Noma'lumlik hissiyotni chuqurlashtiradigan stereotiplarga olib keladi
Aniqki, G'arb va Sharq har xil va noto'g'ri tushunilgan sabablarga ko'ra, har ikki tarafdagi siyosatchilar va ommaviy axborot vositalariga qarama -qarshi so'zlar va stereotiplar juda oson topilgan. Stefan Leyn so'nggi maqolasida Evropaning markazidagi ko'plab afsonalarni va hozirgi tanglikni rsquos. Ulardan biri, G'arbda, Markaziy Evropa va ayniqsa G'arbiy Bolqon mamlakatlari ksenofobiya va avtoritar moyilliklarga moyil. Boshqa, Markaziy Evropada, liberal, chegarasi ochiq G'arb o'zining madaniy merosini ko'zdan qochirgan.
Ikkala fikr ham asossiz va tarixiydir. Yuqorida aytilgan muhojirlarga bo'lgan munosabat va gender masalalaridan tashqari, Sharq va rdquo va ldquoliberal G'arbga oid dalillar kam. & Rdquo Aslida, dinga, ajralish va abortga bo'lgan munosabat har xil ko'rinishga ega. Latviya va Estoniya diniy jihatdan eng kam aniqlangan Evropa davlatlari qatoriga kiradi, Gretsiya esa abortga qarshi Polshadan keyin ikkinchi o'rinda turadi (bu Maltada noqonuniy bo'lib qolmoqda).
O'tmishdagi noto'g'ri qarashlar va umumlashmalarga o'tilmaslik qaror qabul qilishning yomonlashishiga olib keladi. Agar, masalan, Sharq va G'arb tubdan farq qiladigan qadriyatlarga ega deb hisoblansa, & ldquoWestern va rdquo madaniy e'tiqodlari, albatta, Evropa qonunlarining ajralmas qismi va yangi a'zo davlatlar unga kirishi kerak degan qarash deyarli muqarrar bo'lib qoladi. Yevropa parlamenti Vengriya haqidagi hisobotida buni nazarda tutgan. Ammo bu qarash farqlarni e'tiborsiz qoldiradi ichida G'arbiy Evropa bir xil qadriyatlar bo'yicha. Eng muhimi & mdashand mutlaqo keraksiz & mdashit Evropa Ittifoqini qo'llab-quvvatlovchi minglab Baltslarni yoki konservativ moyilligi bo'lgan markaziy evropaliklarni evroseptik populistik lagerga undaydi.
Bu umumlashtirish va afsonalar faqat Sharq va G'arb o'rtasidagi munosabatlarga xosdir, degani emas. Ispaniya va Evropa Ittifoqiga qo'shilish oldidan mashhur frantsuz kinosi "Afrikaning Pireneydan boshlanishini" tasdiqladi. & Rdquo 2010 va ndash2011 yevro inqirozi paytida Evropa va Shimoliy va Janubiy o'rtasidagi kelishmovchiliklar adolatli zaharni keltirib chiqardi.
Ammo so'nggi besh yil mobaynida aynan yangi bo'linish eng ko'p stereotiplarni keltirib chiqardi va endi ular tez-tez ijtimoiy tarmoqlarning g'azabini qo'zg'atadi va haqiqiy siyosatga ta'sir qiladi. Noto'g'ri siyosat qarorlari tufayli paydo bo'lgan norozilik, o'z navbatida, qo'shilishning so'nggi davlatlarini g'azablangan mudofaa chizig'iga aylantirdi, bu esa ularni har xil qilib karikatura qilishni osonlashtirdi va shu bilan zaiflashtiruvchi tsiklni yaratdi.
Notanishlik noto'g'ri tasavvurlar va o'tkazib yuborilgan imkoniyatlarni keltirib chiqaradi
2004 yildan keyin a'zo davlatlarning aksariyati Evropa Ittifoqi siyosatini ishlab chiqish qoidalarini buzmagan. Biroz o'z-o'zini mag'lubiyatga uchragan holda, ko'pchilik Evropa Ittifoqiga nomzod bo'lgan mamlakatning fikriga asoslanib yopishib olmadi. Haqiqatan ham, qaror qabul qilishda qo'lini sinab ko'rganlar, ularga bo'ysunmay, muvaffaqiyatning asosiy elementlarini e'tiborsiz qoldirishdi: ittifoqchilik va munosabatlarni rivojlantirish, ommaviy axborot vositalari va tahlil markazlaridan g'oyalarni ishlab chiqish va jamoatchilik tomonidan qo'llab -quvvatlash. Yangi qo'shilish shtatlari va rsquo elchilari bu usullarni tushunib yetishdi, lekin mintaqadagi ko'plab vazirlar va bosh vazirlar bundan boshqa narsani tushunishmadi, ehtimol Estoniya va Vengriyadan bo'lganlar bundan mustasno, ular Bryusseldagi janglarda mag'lub bo'lishadi, chunki ularning ishlari juda yomon. Keyin ular Evropa Ittifoqining yangi va keksa a'zolari uchun har xil qoidalar qo'llaniladi, degan xulosaga kelishadi va Bryusselni yangi kelganlarga nisbatan adolatsiz va xolis deb ko'rsatishadi, bu qisman to'g'ri.
Evropa Ittifoqiga kirganidan keyin 15 yil va to'rtga yaqin saylov tsikli, ko'pchilik Markaziy Evropa, Bolqon yoki Boltiqbo'yi davlatlari rahbarlari ham G'arbiy Evropadagi hamkasblari bilan shaxsiy munosabatlarni o'rnatolmagan. Estoniya va rsquosning sobiq prezidenti Toomas Ilves (Shvetsiyada tug'ilgan va AQShda tahsil olgan) kabi ba'zi istisnolardan tashqari, Sovuq Urushning sobiq bo'linishidagi sheriklar bilan kam muloqot qilishadi. Evropa Ittifoqi sammitlaridan keyin pivo ichidagi Evropa Ittifoqi etakchilarining tanish rasmlarini o'ylab ko'ring va ular orasida bitta Markaziy Evropani ko'rmang. Bu juda muhim, chunki Germaniya kansleri yoki Frantsiya prezidenti bilan shaxsiy aloqasi bo'lmaganda, mamlakat va rossiya etakchisi Evropa Komissiyasida kerakli portfelni saqlashi yoki byudjet va qonunlarni o'z xohishiga ko'ra o'zgartirishi ehtimoli kamroq.
Markaziy Evropaliklar va rsquo kun tartibini oldinga siljitish uchun bir necha bor muvaffaqiyatsizlikka uchraganini hisobga olsak, mintaqadagi ko'pchilik, Evropa Ittifoqi yangi a'zo davlatlarga bir xil jiddiylik bilan qaramaydi, deb hisoblaydi. And this is not just the view of people far removed from Brussels policymaking. It is also a surprisingly common refrain among senior EU officials from the most recent accession states. They are not entirely wrong&mdashbut, per the points above, the failures are often of their own making.
The perception that double standards are at play carries political consequences. The more people feel that their governments have too little say in the EU&mdashthat the 2004 and later accession members are in effect second-class citizens&mdashthe stronger the antipathy in Central Europe against Brussels becomes. No one likes to be a rule-taker forever. Having tried and failed to make a significant mark on EU policy, the Visegrád countries, in particular, have responded by resorting to mainly presenting policies together, further damaging their ability to be taken seriously. As one Western European member of Carnegie Europe&rsquos group of experts said, &ldquothey need to break out of their ghetto&rdquo if they want to have more influence on EU policies.
What Can Be Done?
The above lessons certainly do not provide the full picture. One could add, for example, the effect of the Eurozone crisis, which, in the eyes of many Central Europeans, destroyed the EU elites&rsquo reputation for competence. However, even if the financial and migration crises had not occurred, another event sooner or later would have exposed the nature of differences at the heart of the East-West relationship. Unless these differences are better understood and managed, the EU will remain crisis-prone.
The good news is that little about the nature of East and West differences suggests they should be more consequential than other EU divides (between large and small countries and between the North and South). The specificities are simply a lot less well understood&mdashdue to an historical unfamiliarity with each other&mdashand therefore more feared. Differences that in other contexts would be, and used to be, seen as innocuous loom more significant than they really are, allowing those who never supported enlargement to argue that it should be reversed. One obvious exception to this is the trend of authoritarianism, which isindeed a challenge to the EU&rsquos existence. But it hardly defines Central Europe as a whole, nor is it confined to the post-2004 accession states.
Three lines of action might help take the sting out of East-West disagreements:
Chip Away at Unfamiliarity
For the EU to work well, the East and West will need to make more of an effort to get to know each other. The goal is not to overcome their differences the EU is a patchwork of regions with greatly varying political cultures and traditions, and the EU project still works reasonably well. The idea is to reduce unfamiliarity&mdashto turn the new members of the EU, in the eyes of the West, from an unknown and perhaps less important part of the continent to one whose differences are seen as charming features of the European landscape. Features like the long silences of the Finns or the siestas of the Spanish are unusual perhaps but are considered profoundly European and celebrated as enriching the cultural diversity of the EU.
Steps taken before Central European countries&rsquo accession to the EU, such as providing scholarships for students from candidate countries, have helped acquaint the two sides with each other but only up to a point. They produced a mostly one-way (westward) flow of people and knowledge. Because the West remains much wealthier than the East and has better schools, far fewer Westerners have traveled eastward. Moreover, many Easterners have stayed in the West, meaning that opportunities to help their countries of origin better understand Western mind-sets are being lost.
In a free but economically uneven Europe, the flow of people and ideas will always be lopsided, but for Europe to work as one, there need to be more long-term, ingrained learning opportunities. This will be a generational challenge, but steps such as making sure that textbooks introduce the ex-communist countries to Robert Schuman or Konrad Adenauer, two of the EU&rsquos founding fathers, and the Western Europeans to József Antall or Lech Wałęsa, two heroes of the democratic revolutions in Central Europe, could start making a difference within a few years. EU treaties leave education largely in the hands of member states, so European countries need to lead the effort to improve the teaching of each other&rsquos history.
Central Europeans, for their part, should invest in French and English-language websites about their politics and history. Similarly, perhaps a joint East-West TV channel, such as a German-Polish one modeled after Franco-German ARTE, might help. The EU, after all, overcame much greater gaps in familiarity&mdasheven open hostility&mdashafter World War II. But those successes did not just organically happen over time they required a conscious effort. Nothing similar has taken place since the reunification of Europe&rsquos East and West, and the EU is now paying the price.
Informed discussions on what ails East-West relations remain rare, but the mood appears to be turning, with the Iqtisodchi and other media now giving more space to, and thoughtful treatment of, the issue. More such intelligent coverage is badly needed. When politicians and opinion-forming media perpetuate the view that the East and West are fundamentally incompatible, they lend support and credibility to the argument that the EU should divide into two classes of membership. Some politicians will continue to hold this line for electoral gains, but there are ways to reach those who support it unwittingly.
One way to improve media coverage of the East-West discourse is through generating more nonbiased research and data that pierces through the many stereotypes and generalizations surrounding the relationship. In the age of the twenty-four-hour news cycle, opinion-forming media outlets are constantly hungry for content and would be interested in the data if it were to come from trustworthy sources, have a basis in solid research, and be timed to coincide with newsworthy events.
In the Czech Republic, a coalition of individuals, businesses, and organizations concerned about rising euroskepticism have come together to fund research into how the Czechs regard the EU and why. The data are available to everyone who wants to their sharpen arguments regarding continued membership in the EU. Similar efforts also have sprung up in other Central European countries, even if they are mostly for local audiences and in local languages.
What is needed now is a cross-boundary look at how the East and West regard each other, what underlying beliefs inform those views, and which communication strategies could most effectively bridge the divide. That sort of research will require money and collaboration among polling agencies, think tanks, and communication experts.
Lastly, help from the top will be needed: more intelligent media coverage and research will count for little unless Europe&rsquos leaders in both regions join the effort. The president-elect of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has shown the desire to be a bridge builder, most notably by dividing the rule of law portfolio of work between Central and Western European commissioners. Her State of the Union speeches will present further opportunities to push back against the myth of East-West &ldquoincompatibility.&rdquo
Forge Collaboration at the Top
If Central European leaders want to exercise more influence in Brussels&mdashand change the perception at home that the EU does not listen to them or care&mdashthey need to start floating joint policy proposals with their Western European counterparts on issues where they see potential commonalities and shared interests. These include incentives to shift to cleaner electric cars and ways to deepen Europe&rsquos single market.
The idea is not only to improve the EU&rsquos image in Central Europe but also to change the most recent accession states&rsquo reputation for having little constructive to say on anything beyond &ldquousual&rdquo Central European priorities such as enlargement or Russia. While the Baltic governments are already closely cooperating with the Nordic governments in an informal Hanseatic League, the Central European countries influence EU policy only intermittently and at the working level in Brussels. Far too little collaboration on EU policy happens at the top levels of government, so Central Europe&rsquos reputation further west is primarily informed by opposition to quotas for asylum seekers or tighter emission controls.
Admittedly, the advice for newer member states to refrain from only banding together seems to differ from the current typical approach, as most EU coalitions are regional. The Benelux countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) team up with one another when they need to get things done in the EU so do the Southern Europeans. When Central Europeans&rsquo interests align, such as on the sale of inferior foods in their region, it makes sense for them to stick together.
But on most other issues, they would be better off reaching out westward, in order to improve their image in the West and to make it more difficult for euroskeptics to argue that the EU does not take its newer members seriously. The Central European countries, along with others who joined in 2004 or after, face a unique policy challenge. They came to the EU later than other members and need to work harder to prove themselves. The fastest way for their preferences to gain legitimacy is to be endorsed by the older member states.
Where to Start
All the above recommendations may seem trivial or irrelevant to Europe&rsquos major challenges. They do not propose ways to resolve rule of law issues or East-West disagreements on migration.
But that was never the intention. The point is that each potential solution needs to start with a reflection on the deeper, underlying problems of poor understanding the propensity to buy into stereotypes, generalizations, and misperceptions and the lack of a common political agenda to support East-West relations. Without a greater understanding of why the East and West sometimes see things differently, the differences will continue to plague EU policymaking.
Unless the East and West learn about, and largely accept, the nature of their differences, they risk the gap widening again, when a new crisis appeals to the different instincts in them. The smart approach would be to take stock now of what has gone wrong in the relationship and to start developing solutions while the memories of the post-2015 fallout over migration are still fresh, but the passions have cooled somewhat.
Carnegie Europe is grateful to the German Federal Foreign Office and the Körber Foundation for their financial support of this publication. The views expressed in this article are the author&rsquos only and do not necessarily represent those of the funders or the full group of assembled experts, who wish to remain anonymous.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
Western World mainly refers to Europe and North America. Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are some of the most common religions practiced in the Western world.
People in the west are more open-minded than those in the east. The westerns are more open and forthright. For example, topics such as the birth of a child and sex are still taboo in some eastern countries.
People in the west are also more open about their feelings. If they are angry, they might express. But people in the east might cover it for the sake of diplomacy and politeness. Westerns may also display their feelings and emotions in public.
Moreover, the individual is given preference over family, so a person has more freedom and power to take decisions on his own, unlike those in the east. Therefore, concepts like arranged marriages are not common in the west they marry for love.
Why are urban and rural areas so politically divided?
In both North America and Western Europe, the political divide is increasingly a geographic divide. Urban areas are more liberal, and rural areas are more conservative. In the 2016 presidential election, Hillary Clinton won metropolitan areas with more than 1 million residents and Donald Trump won all other types of areas. In the 2018 midterm election, Democrats won every congressional district in the most urban areas, while Republicans won 87 percent of rural districts.
Urban-rural divides are likely to continue growing. Yet it is unclear why they are happening. One possibility is that living in dense urban environments with a diverse mix of people promotes liberal values, while living in small towns and rural areas promotes political conservatism. But my research suggests that this is not the reason. People aren’t much affected by the experience of living in these environments.
Instead, the urban-rural divide exists because different types of people decide to live in different geographic areas in the first place.
The urban-rural divide in Western Europe
My research focuses on Western Europe, where urban-rural divides are important. In France, for example, “yellow vest” protesters claim that President Emmanuel Macron’s policies favor wealthy urbanites at the expense of poorer rural residents. In Britain, urban dwellers tend to oppose Brexit and want a connection to the European Union, while small-town and rural residents tend to favor leaving the E.U.
In general, the core supporters of right-wing populist political parties across Europe are in more rural areas, where they feel left behind the globalized economy and alienated from the multiculturalism of European capitals.
People live in urban and rural areas for reasons that are associated with political preferences. My research suggests that these sorting processes drive urban-rural political polarization.
Macroeconomic trends have concentrated better-educated professionals in big cities, where jobs have expanded for highly skilled workers in financial services, technology and creative industries. Meanwhile, agriculture and manufacturing have declined in small towns and rural areas. As better-educated people leave these areas, they are increasingly dominated by less-educated manual workers.
The relationship between socioeconomic status and geography is important for politics because better-educated professionals tend to be the most positive about immigration, while less-educated manual laborers tend to be the most negative about immigration. I analyze data from 13 West European countries and find that people with the same educational and occupational profile tend to have the same immigration attitudes, regardless of where they live. And in research on Switzerland, I find that people who move to big cities tend to have progressive political views before their move. Regardless of education or occupation, people who move to large cities are more positive about immigration and the European Union and are less likely to support radical right-wing parties.
However, it does not work in reverse: Conservatives are not moving into rural areas, at least in Switzerland. Swiss people who move to rural areas are more liberal than the people already living there. This may arise simply because people who make major geographic moves tend to have a higher socioeconomic status and thus more liberal attitudes regardless of where they move.
Why does Western Europe tend to have small 'in between' countries? - Tarix
What do they expect? What do they really want? What were the "suffragists" really fighting for?
Pretty much all of our ancestors lived in poverty. Who was happier, us or them?
And what is poverty? How much does it cost to live? What is the difference between poverty in the United States and in other countries? Is it better to be in poverty in the United States than in poorer countries?
What we call poverty in America is "relative poverty". It isn't that the poor can't acquire the basic necessities, but that they are poor relative to other members of society, and thus fall below a "decent standard of living".
So what then is rich? The rich in the future will certainly be richer than the rich today. And the rich of today are certainly richer than the rich of the past. Thus rich is not an absolute state, but rather a relative state. To the extent rich is an absolute state, it means having the means to acquire anything you want with little to no effort. Or to put it another way, it is a person who lives wholly or largely off the work of others. Thus there cannot be rich unless there are poor. The rich require someone to provide labor and services for them to enjoy.
When we examine the evils and miseries of poverty more closely, we'll see that it all stems from the same thing, inequality. Life without cell phones doesn't suck on its own, but it does suck when other people have them and you don't. Inequality is the seed of hatred and resentment.
This obsession with poverty is a waste of time. Not only because poverty is not as important as it seems, but because it distracts us from the greater evil, inequality. The reason we focus on poverty is because so-called solutions to poverty always mean more money for the producers and the distributors. Thus paradoxically, it is the rich who want to solve poverty far more than the poor, so long as they are in a position to profit.
My point wasn't that a caste-system is good. My point was, people are happier where there is less in-group inequality, and where they are competing against fewer people. If there are two people, then there is one winner and one loser. If there are a hundred people, there is one winner and ninety-nine losers.
Imagine your slave ancestors. They had wives and families, big families, but how? Who would want to marry a slave? That's simple, another slave. But what if you were the only slave? Who would marry you?
A lot of people complain that slave-masters having sex with their slaves was rape, regardless of it was consensual, because of the "imbalance of power". But slave women mostly had sex with their white masters because they were rich and could give them better better conditions, better food, less work, or no work at all. So what is the fundamental difference between that and gold-diggers today? And isn't gold-digger just a fancy name for prostitute?
Furthermore, we have to look at the nature of a society. Throughout almost all of human history, we lived in small tribes/clans of extended family. Small groups tend to self-regulate. It is difficult to imagine many prostitutes in a medieval village. Prostitution is always and forever an urban phenomenon, where everyone are strangers, and thus feel no responsibility for anyone else. They're only out for themselves.
There is a huge difference between competing with your friends/family, and with strangers. Your family cares about you. Thus even if your brother wins, you'll likely benefit in some way. But if you're competing against strangers, they'll take everything and leave you with nothing. Thus the competition among strangers is necessarily ruthless, callous, and selfish.
I agree somewhat, but I also disagree somewhat. The primary motivation for most things men do is sex. To gain access to women we compete among other men for a position in society. The highest positions generally get the first choice of women.
If you're only allowed to marry black women, and black women are only allowed to marry black men, then your competition for sex is limited only to other black men. Thus whether Norwegians are richer than me doesn't matter to me as long as they stay in Norway.
With that said, I am not in favor of segregation. I am for separation. I hate this world of strangers. I want to create a world of family. But you can't have a world of family with 8 billion people all following their temporary economic interests wherever it leads them.
You seem eager to compete against me, but why are we together in the first place? Do you actually want to be with me? Why won't you just let me go? Is this your country? Is this your land? How did this become your land? What right do you have to anything?
Suffragists wanted to vote. They wanted a say in matters regarding the government, in matters affecting them. Same thing any American citizen would and should have.
Bilmadim. I don't think my ancestors were that much happier than I am. I look back at what they had, and what I have. I am happier to live today than back then. I can shout if I'm unhappy. I don't live in as much fear as Black people did back in the days of Jim Crow.
|And what is poverty? How much does it cost to live? What is the difference between poverty in the United States and in other countries? Is it better to be in poverty in the United States than in poorer countries?|
I cannot believe you would ask such a contrarian question. Everyone knows what poverty is. You know what it is. And I wouldn't want to be poor anywhere. Life is hard being poor. It may be harder being poor somewhere like India or Mexico than here. However, I wouldn't want to be poor ANYWHERE.
|What we call poverty in America is "relative poverty". It isn't that the poor can't acquire the basic necessities, but that they are poor relative to other members of society, and thus fall below a "decent standard of living".|
Being poor often means your quality of life suffers. Being poor means you will live is quite shoddy housing. The food you eat won't be that good. Go somewhere like rural Appalachia or some rural areas of the Mississippi Delta. Many places look similar to 3rd world areas.
|So what then is rich? The rich in the future will certainly be richer than the rich today. And the rich of today are certainly richer than the rich of the past. Thus rich is not an absolute state, but rather a relative state. To the extent rich is an absolute state, it means having the means to acquire anything you want with little to no effort. Or to put it another way, it is a person who lives wholly or largely off the work of others. Thus there cannot be rich unless they are poor. The rich require someone to provide labor and services for them to enjoy.|
Rich of the future may be richer than the rich of tomorrow. However, I wasn't even talking about being rich. I did talk about rising out of being poor.
|When we examine the evils and miseries of poverty more closely, we'll see that it all stems from the same thing, inequality. Life without cell phones doesn't suck on its own. It only suck when other people have them and you don't. Inequality is the seed of hatred and resentment.|
And where does inequality come from? It comes from not being able to raise one's self out of certain conditions. It often comes from barriers being put in place to make it harder for people to achieve. Life with a cell phone is getting harder. It's difficult to get a job (even an entry level job) if you don't have a number someone can call you at. Consider this. If you're poor and don't have a car, it's hard to get around. Many jobs are located in places where public transportation doesn't go to. Or in many case, some poor people live where no buses go (such as rural areas). Inequality is created when one group is favored over another. Jim Crow created alot of inequality.
|This obsession with poverty is a waste of time. Not only because poverty is not as important as it seems, but because it distracts us from the greater evil, inequality. The reason we focus on poverty is because so-called solutions to poverty always mean more money for the producers and the distributors. Thus paradoxically, it is the rich who want to solve poverty far more than the poor, so long as they are in a position to profit.|
No it isn't a waste of time. Poverty and inequality are linked. You can say what you will about some rich people. However, the reason poverty is an issue is because of the desperation that comes from it. Poverty and inequality are linked in the larger picture.
|My point wasn't that a caste-system is good. My point was, people are happier where there is less in-group inequality, and where they are competing against fewer people. If there are two people, then there is one winner and one loser. If there are a hundred people, there is one winner and ninety-nine losers.|
There will be winners and losers. However, one of the ways inequality gets created comes from people not being allowed the opportunity to compete. When you can't even compete, that creates inequality. When race determines whether or not you can compete or not, it becomes a bigger problem. And something you need to understand about the caste system. It is inequality in itself.
|Imagine your slave ancestors. They had wives and families, big families, but how? Who would want to marry a slave? That's simple, another slave. But what if you were the only slave? Who would marry you?|
Slaves were often sold off and separated from their families. This was a big problem. If one was the only slave, said slave got sold off. And there was plenty of inequality from the slave system. Slaves living in the rude shacks of the slave quarters while the master and his blood family lived in comfort. Inequality right there. How do you prevent any kind of resentment? You convince the slave that he is inferior and that slavery is his fate in life. You convince the slave that because of his skin color, he's destined to be a slave, and to make him accept his fate.
|A lot of people complain that slave-masters having sex with their slaves was rape, regardless of it was consensual, because of the "imbalance of power". But the truth is, slave women had sex with their white masters mostly they were rich, and could give them better better conditions, better food, less work, or no work at all. So what is the fundamental difference between that and gold-diggers today? And isn't gold-digger just a fancy name for prostitute?|
Well, when you are considered property, you don't get much say in terms of consenting to sexual relations. You just learned to accept what was. And alot of those "rich slave women" were often in Louisiana, and were known for being in "left handed marriages". They were lighter-skinned concubines. Most females slaves didn't even get this fate. I've read enough about slavery to know that what you're saying isn't totally correct.
There are times people within your own group will turn on you because of what you have. People who lived in clans tended to self-regulate voluntarily. And consider that back in those days, human movement wasn't as vast as it is now.
There are many cases where family members have turned on each other. Human beings will do horrible things even to their own families.
Sex isn't always the reason many men do what they do. In alot of cases, MONEY is the reason many a man do what they do.
Historically, the men of high positions married women of high positions. However, consider this. In many cases, it isn't always the men with the most money getting the women. I've seen it for myself.
If you aren't limited in terms of who you can marry, it might open you up to alot of competition. However, it will open other people up for competition. What if you don't fit in to the culture you live in? What if you get rejected by your own women? If you're not limited, you can always go somewhere else. With infinite freedom, there is infinite competition. But there are also more chances you could win.
|With that said, I am not in favor of segregation. I am for separation. I hate this world of strangers. I want to create a world of family. But you can't have a world of family with 8 billion people all following their temporary economic interests wherever it leads them. Capitalism destroys communities and families. It must die.|
I have considered this a lot the past few years. I think a case could be made for it. Of course, none of the eastern European countries are perfect, but most of them have lived through the hell of communism and hardcore socialism and they know what it's like. They (many of them) are moving away from it, whereas we smart Americans are moving towards it. thinking that the result will somehow be different than it has been every other time. (a good definition of insanity)
I've worked with several people over the years who escaped communism in the USSR and eastern Europe. Their eyes were open. Ours are closed. It's pretty sad when Russia and the former east block (at least much of the population who knows tyranny and wants no part of it) is trying to move in the right direction and we are trying to emulate the hell that was the USSR. Thinking communism 2.0 will be somehow better than communism 1.0
1) Suffragists were just part of a larger feminist movement comprised almost entirely of middle and upper-class women who wanted political and economic power. I don't blame them, but they're no heroes.
2) You have more material things, more comforts. They had better relationships.
3) I would rather be a medieval serf than live on the southside of Chicago. I would rather live in a tent in the woods and eat unseasoned food than live on the southside of Chicago. What sucks about being poor in America is having to be around other poor people. It probably wasn't so bad to be poor in Sweden or Britain back in the 1970's, but now it is miserable, especially if you're white.
Reminds me of that George Carlin quote. "The upper class keeps all of the money, pays none of the taxes. The middle class pays all of the taxes, does all of the work. The poor are there just to scare the sh-- out of the middle class. Keep them showing up at those jobs."
4) You'd be so lucky to eat like a medieval peasant.
5) Inequality is 100% natural. Even if there were no obstacles, there would be inequality. An anarcho-capitalist system would be even more unequal than America is today.
6) You need a car because cars exist. You need a cell phone because cell phones exist. But what if they didn't exist?
7) I was just using slavery and the caste-system to explain a concept pertaining to competition.
8) There were certainly many slave women who preferred to be a concubine because it afforded them special privileges. So while I agree that the slave system was by its nature coercive, many were basically the slave-equivalent of a gold-digger. Regardless, my focus was not on slavery, but the "imbalance of power". I was more trying to make an analogy to wealth-imbalances generally, and the concept of "hypergamy"(people want to "marry up"). Thus if you're a male slave, and you're at the bottom economically and socially, you would have very few options if not for the existence of female slaves, also at the bottom, in a time where miscegenation was illegal.
9) Families are far more likely to stab each other in the back today than in the past. Family isn't as close as they used to be, and people can basically get away with things because they can always go somewhere to escape any social consequences. My sister does meth and basically lives like a hoodrat criminal. But that is only possible because there is a whole swath of the city filled with people like her. If she lived with her family, separate from the rest of "society", she would have been a good person.
10) But why do they want money? Isn't the primary desire for money, women? You know, buying a big house, a nice car, etc, what's it for?
11) While what you said is theoretically true, if you look at the historical record, that is never what happens. But I think you misunderstand me. You're imagining New York City but where people only marry people within their own group. As I said before, I don't believe in segregation, it doesn't work. Either we must separate, or we must come together.
12) Separation means to live in a completely separate society/government/etc. France is separated from Germany(more so before the European Union). The Jews were segregated into ghettos in Medieval Europe. Blacks were segregated into their own part of town. But they still lived in the same society, had the same government, with the same laws, paid the same taxes, fought for the same Army, etc.
8. Food sucks
Eastern Europe isn’t known for its variety of exquisite dishes. Most of the dishes are a combination of three ingredients: bread, potatoes, and meat. While it’s very hearty, it’s also very flavorless. If you’re there on a short trip or at the beginning of a more extended sojourn, you might find the food interesting and even exotic, but I can guarantee that you’ll quickly get tired of it.
Once you get tired of going out and eating bland local food, you’ll have two options: go to restaurants that serve international cuisine or cook your own food. The problem with the first option is that the international restaurant scene is rather limited in Eastern Europe. While there’re plenty of international restaurants in huge cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg, you won’t have many good options in the smaller cities.
Here in Vilnius, Lithuania, a mid-sized city of half a million located in the European Union, my only reliable option is to have a decent, albeit pricy, burger. There are a couple of ethnic restaurants that serve Mexican or Greek food, but they leave a lot to be desired the Mexican food is bland, the Greek food is not only bland but also expensive. Don’t get me started on the crappy pizza or flavorless Italian food. As a result, I simply all but stopped going out and now mostly cook my own meals.
It’s situations like these that I miss living in New York. There, I can leave my apartment and eat any kind of food from pretty much any country I want, any time of the day, any day of the week, and within any price range. I also remember fondly my days of living in Brazil and Argentina, where I constantly ate fantastic churrasco or a juicy steak, respectively.
If you like food with flavor (please remind me how spicy food tastes) or are a vegetarian, you’ll have a pretty difficult time in Eastern Europe.
Here are 10 things Europe does way better than America
The term “American exceptionalism” is often tossed around by politicians. Neocons, far-right Christian fundamentalists and members of the Republican Party in particular seem to hate it when anyone dares to suggest that some aspects of European life are superior to how we do things. But facts are facts, and the reality is that in some respects, Europe is way ahead of the United States. From health care to civil liberties to sexual attitudes, one can make a strong case for “European exceptionalism.” That is not to say that Europe isn’t confronting some major challenges in 2014: neoliberal economic policies and brutal austerity measures are causing considerable misery in Greece, Spain and other countries. The unemployment rate in Spain, the fourth largest economy in the Eurozone, stands at a troubling 26%—although Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Iceland have lower unemployment rates than the U.S. (5.1% in Germany, 3.1.% in Switzerland, 4.6% in Iceland, 4.2% in Denmark). But problems and all, Europe continues to be one of the most desirable parts of the world. And the U.S.—a country that is in serious decline both economically and in terms of civil liberties—needs to take a close look at some of the things that European countries are doing right.
Below are 10 examples of “European exceptionalism” and areas in which Europe is way ahead of the United States.
1 . Lower Incarceration Rates
Benjamin Franklin famously said that those who are willing to sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither, and the U.S. is more dangerous than most of Europe (especially in terms of homicide) even though it is becoming more and more of a police state. The U.S. incarcerates, per capita, more people than any other country in the world: in 2012, the U.S.’ incarceration rate, according to the International Centre for Prison Studies, was 707 per 100,000 people compared to only 60 per 100,000 in Sweden, 72 per 100,000 in Norway, 78 per 100,000 in Germany, 75 per 100,000 in the Netherlands, 87 per 100,000 in Switzerland, 99 per 100,000 in Italy, 103 per 100,000 in France, and 144 per 100,000 in Spain. Certainly, the failed War on Drugs and the Prison/Industrial Complex are major factors in the U.S.’ appallingly high incarceration rate, and unless the U.S. seriously reforms its draconian drug laws, it will continue to lock up a lot more of its people than Europe.
2. Less Violent Crime Than the U.S.
Major European cities like Brussels, Paris, Berlin and Milan can be very bad for nonviolent petty crimes like pickpocketing. The tradeoff, however, is that much of Europe—especially Western Europe—tends to have a lot less violent crime than the United States. Research conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime found that in 2012, the U.S. had a homicide rate of 4.8 per 100,000 people compared to only 0.3 per 100,000 in Iceland, 0.7 per 100,000 in Sweden, 0.8 per 100,000 in Denmark and Spain, 0.9 per 100,000 in Italy, Austria and the Netherlands, 1.0 per 100,000 in France, and 1.2 per 100,000 in Portugal and the Republic of Ireland. Russia, however, had a homicide rate of 9.2 per 100,000 that year, but overall, one is more likely to be murdered in the U.S. than in Europe.
3. Better Sex Education Programs, Healthier Sexual Attitudes
For decades, the Christian Right has been trying to convince Americans that social conservatism and abstinence-only sex education programs will reduce the number of unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. The problem is that the exact opposite is true: European countries with comprehensive sex-ed programs and liberal sexual attitudes actually have pastroq rates of teen pregnancy and STDs. Looking at data provided by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Guttmacher Institute, Advocates for Youth and other sources, one finds a lot more teen pregnancies in the U.S. than in Europe. Comprehensive sex-ed programs are the norm in Europe, where in 2008, there were teen birth rates of 5.3 per 1000 in the Gollandiya, 4.3 per 1000 in Switzerland and 9.8 per 1000 in Germany compared to 41.5 per 1000 in the United States. In 2009, Germany had one-sixth the HIV/AIDS rate of the United States (0.1% of Germany’s adult population living with HIV or AIDS compared to 0.6% of the U.S. adult population), while the Netherlands had one-third the number of people living with HIV or AIDS that year (0.2% of the Netherlands’ population compared to 0.6% of the U.S.’ adult population).
4. Anti-GMO Movement Much More Widespread
Anti-GMO activists are fighting an uphill battle in the U.S., where the Monsanto Corporation (the leading provider of GMO seeds) has considerable lobbying power and poured a ton of money into defeating GMO labeling measures in California and Washington State. Some progress has been made on the anti-GMO front in the U.S.: in April, Vermont passed a law requiring that food products sold in that state be labeled if they contain GMO ingredients (Monsanto, not surprisingly, has been aggressively fighting the law). And GMO crops have been banned in Mendocino County, California. But in Europe, GMO restrictions are much more widespread. France, Switzerland, Austria, Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Greece are among the countries that have either total or partial bans on GMOs. And in Italy, 16 of the country’s 20 regions have declared themselves to be GMO-free when it comes to agriculture.
5. Saner Approaches to Abortion
Logic never was the Christian Right’s strong point. The same far-right Christian fundamentalists who favor outlawing abortion and overturning the U.S. Supreme Court’s Roe va Veyd decision of 1973 cannot grasp the fact that two of the things they bitterly oppose—contraception and comprehensive sex education programs—reduce the number of unplanned pregnancies and therefore, reduce the need for abortions. But in many European countries, most politicians are smart enough to share Bill Clinton’s view that abortion should be “safe, legal and rare.” And the ironic thing is that European countries that tend to be sexually liberal also tend to have lower abortion rates. The Guttmacher Institute has reported that Western Europe, factoring in different countries, has an average of 12 abortions per 1000 women compared to 19 per 1000 women in North America (Eastern Europe, according to Guttmacher, has much higher abortion rates than Western Europe). Guttmacher’s figures take into account Western Europe on the whole, although some countries in that part of the world have fallen below that 12 per 1000 average. For example, the UN has reported that in 2008, Switzerland (where abortion is legal during the first trimester) had an abortion rate of 6.4 per 1,000 women compared to 19.6 per 1000 women in the U.S. that year. And Guttmacher has reported that countries where abortion is illegal or greatly restricted tend to have higher abortion rates than countries where it is legal: back-alley abortions are common in Latin America and Africa.
Clearly, better sex education, easier access to birth control and universal healthcare are decreasing the number of abortions in Western Europe. So instead of harassing, threatening and terrorizing abortion providers, the Christian Right needs to examine the positive effects that sexually liberal attitudes are having in Switzerland and other European countries.